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Research Papers: Refinements of Nash Equilibrium
Paper No: 1897 
Title: Refinements of Nash Equilibrium
Publication Year: 2005
Author(s): Srihari Govindan; Robert B. Wilson 
Abstract Text: This paper describes ways that the definition of an equilibrium among players’ strategies in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from decision theory. Refinements of John Nash’s 1950 definition aim primarily to distinguish equilibria in which implicit commitments are credible due to incentives. One group of refinements requires sequential rationality as the game progresses. Another ensures credibility by considering perturbed games in which every contingency occurs with positive probability, which has the further advantage of excluding weakly dominated strategies.
Keywords: economic theory
Paper Copy Available: No
Electronic Copy Available: Yes. Click to  view the document (PDF).